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BUILDING RESTRICTIONS IN GENERAL PLAN-ENFORCEMENT
-EQUITABLE

DEFENCE-CHANGE

IN CHARACTER AND CONDI-

at., 57
N. E. 1051 (Ill.), 1900. At common law, upon a conveyance in
fee, a covenant made with the owner of the land for his benefit, if it
touched and concerned the land devised, would pass to his assignees.
If, however, the covenant was made by the owner and restricted
his use of the land, it would not pass to his assignees unless it
created certain well-known easements. In equity, a class of exceptions to the latter part of the common-law rule was established.
The exceptions were based on the doctrine that covenants or agreements "to use or abstain from using" bound the person, not the
TION OF THE PROPERY.-BEwertsea et al. v.Gerstenberg et

NOTES.

land, and were enforceable against every subsequent purchaser
who took with actual or constructive notice. Equity also took
bold of a group of cases where the owner of a large tract, undertaking building improvements, laid it out in lots, and imposed
on the purchasers restrictions in accordance with his plan. The
vendor's intention once clearly establi-hed, the right to enforce the
restrictions was given to the purchasers without regard to priority of
title.
Suppose it is determined that the vendor has acted for the common
benefit of the purchasers, and they have bought, induced by his
intention, and have, therefore, strictly speaking, rights one against
the other in regard to the restrictions, will equity enfbrce such agreements when the original plan has been abandoned, and the character,
condition and uses of the property have greatly changed. This
question is considered in the following case: Jerome Case, being the
owner of a porti,,n of outlot F, in the city of Chicago, divided it
into lots, blocks and streets, and recorded a plan thereof, on which
was marked a line called "Building Line," thirty feet within the
street lines of said lots. Block 1 of outlot F was bounded on the
north by Wrightwood avenue, and on the east by Orchard street.
Lots 1 and 2, situated in the corner of Block 1, at the intersection
of the aforesaid streets, were sold to the defendant, who bought with
notice of the plan, but without an express clause of rtstriction in his
deed. Lots 29 and 30, situated on Orchard street, south of defendant's lots, were sold to the complainants, their deeds containing a
restrictive clause to the effect that a space of 30 feet from the street
as marked in the plan should remain open. It is evident from the
plan, and so the court viewed it, that the restrictions were imposed in
order that the property might be better adapted for residence purposes. If the intention was to make it a business section the restrictions would have been practically without meaning. Now the lot
owners in the vicinity of defendant and complainants did not keep
their agreements. Those on the Wrightwood avenue side of Block 1
built business structures to the line of the street. Those immediately
south of complainants encroached on the reserved space to within
25 to 19 feet from Orchard street, but did not put up other than
dwelling-houses. There were other encroachments on lands in the
vicinity subject to the same restriction. Complainants had acquiesced
in the encroachments for some years. Defendant now began to
construct an apartment house within 4 feet of the Orchard street
line, and this breach the complainants sought to restrain by injunction. The defendant rested his case on two grounds: 1. His deed
contained no express restriction. 2. Assuming this contention to be
without weight, the great change in the character and uses of the
property, acquiesced in by the complainants, would make the restriction a great hardship to him and of n. benefit to them. The first
point the court overruled, holding that an express clause in the deed
was unnecessary because the defendant had constructive notice of
the restriction from the plan, it being the common source of title.
The second point, however, the court sustained, holding that the
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appropriation of many of the lots to business purposes, taken
together with the encroachments on lots adjoining the complainants, rendered the restrictions of little or no value to the property,
but in fact a positive hindrance to its proper use. Also that complainants, by permitting the broken agreements, had put themselves
in the actual position of those persons who had done the breaking,
and naturally could not complain if a new breach was committed.
On the first point the decision expresses well-settled law. Indeed,
the rule has been applied where no written covenants'at all existed,
but oral representations only that the plan would he carried out
were made: Tallinadgev. Bank, 26 N. Y. 105 (1862).
The principle applied in this case in support of the second contention of the tfendant can be traced to the leading case of Duke of
Bedford v. Trustees of Brilish Museum, 2 Mylne 0. K. 552 (1822).
It cites no authority for the position it takes. The soundness of the
decision, however, it is too late to question. It is the basis of many
English cases and the starting point of the doctrine as now developed in the United States. The Duke and the trustees agreed, upon
a conveyance made by the former, that the property should be preserved for residence purposes. The feoffor, himself, then put up a
number of buildings in the neighborhood. The purchasers starting
to build on their lands, he sought to restrain them. But the court
said that he had so altered the face of the property that it would be
inequitable to enforce a contract which he really treated as void. It
must either be enforced in toto or not at all. It is important to
notice that the change in condition occurred through the acts of the
grantor. There is, perhaps, stronger reason for retising an iiijunction here than in a case where the hardship resulted from events
beyond his control. In Boper v. Williams, T. & R. 18 (1822),
Lord Eldon said, the vendor, ulhen he takes a covenant from all the
purchasers, acts for their common benefit and becomes a quasi
trustee for them. If he seeks to enforce a covenant of this kind he
must suffer no such breach as will frustrate the benefit that would
otherwise accrue to the other parties to the agreement. Following
this decision Vice-Chancellor Wood refused an injunction where
there were covenants among the purchasers inter se and where the
defendant purchaser bought with full knowvledge of breaches committed before he took the deed. The basis of his decision is clearly
stated. "The principal point is this: here is a common scheme, and
it is one thing to say that parties may pursue any remedy they may
be entitled to at law, and another thing to say that this court will
grant specific performance of an arrangement which can only be
carried out in part. A court of equity will say, the vendor cannot
enforce these rules when he has suffired the whole of his original
tobe broken up." Peek v. Matthews, L. R., 3 Eq. 515 (1867).
design
See also Sayers v. Collyer, 24 Ch. D. 180 (1883), where the judge
restricted his inquiry concerning the breaches to these covenants in
respect to the block on which the alleged breach was committed, the
covenants being expressly confined to that particular block.
In New York the rule has been extended to cover cases where a
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contingency, not contemplated by the parties and beyond their control, has made the restriction unreasonable and oppressive. Where
two adjoining landowners agree to use their lands for places of
residence, and not allow any trade or business to be conducted
thereon, and an elevated railroad is constructed along the street, the
running of trains destroying privacy and quiet and rendering the
premises unfit for dwelling purposes as originally intended, the
agreements will not be enforceable: Columbia College v. Thacher,
87 N.Y. 311 (1883). An injunction was also refused where the defendant had erected a tenement house contrary to his agreement, and
justified his action on the ground that nearby blocks had become a
tenement district: Amerman v. Deane, 132 N. Y. 357 (1892). The
same doctrine would very likely be applied in Massachusetts. It
was substantially adopted in Jackson v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496
(1892). There is also a dictum by Judge Bigelow to the effect that
if one or two owners seek to enforce a restriction against a number of
other proprietors with similar rights and interests, as a res ult of which
great financial loss will be inflicted on the latter, or a public
improvement prevented, equity would very likely not grant an
injunction: Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen, 349 (1863). In England, however, even to advance a public improvement, equity will
not permit a breach of covenant: Lloyd v. -B. 1. Co., 2 De G. J. &
S. 568 (1865).
The Pennsylvania view is well illnstrated by the case of Landell
v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. 331 (1896). The covenant, here sought to be
enforced in 1895, was made in 1832. It concerned property on Chestnut street, and the grantor bound himself and assigns forever to raise
no structure higher than ten feet on land retained. Whatwas then a
residence neighborhood was now devoted to business purposes. The
judge asked himself first whether the covenant ran with the land.
The answer was: such is the intention of the parties, and it will therefore be enforced in equity, it being of no purpose to argue that such a
restriction will retard the improvement of property. If the plaintiff'
still realizes a substantial benefit from its operation it is enforceable.
But "1equity would not interpose and retard improvements simply to
sustain the literal observance of a condition or covenant." It is interesting to notice the attitude which this court, in the exercise of its
equitable jurisdiction, takes toward such a covenant; first deciding
whether it runs with the land, and then deciding whether it will
bind an assignee with notice. See on this point Tulk v. Mozhay,
2 Phill. 774 (1848).
The cases reviewed show the general doctrine. It might further
be asked whether any remedy is left to the complainants in the principal case. From the theory of the decision it follows that no
remedy is necessary, because no injury is suffered from the breach.
Where the vendor himself, however, has suffered certain vendees
to break the covenants, and seeks to prevent others from so acting,
equity says he must go to law and collect what damages he can.
Be sues on the covenants made with him. His legal remedy is
clear, though he may have incurred no damage. But what legal
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remedy have the complainants against the defendant. Hehas made
no agreement with them. He has not even made an express agreement with the vendor for their benefit. And if -he had made the
latter, and the complainants would bring suit on the theory that
they were third party beneficiaries of the contract, the rule ought
not to be extended to give them such right: Barrow v. Richards, 8
Paige, 351 (1840). Finally, a vendor may show a clear intention to
abandon a plan, by selling lots free from restrictions after he has.
sold other lots bound thereby. If the court is satisfied he has given
up his original purpose, an injunction will be denied him, although
there may be no evidence of a changed condition of the neighborhood. Such a change may occur as a result of the vendor's waiver
and the court will then find its decree useless: Duncanv. R. R. Co.,
85 Ky. 525 (1887). A view more favorable to the vendor is taken
1. K. S.
in Reilly v. Otto, 66 N. W. 228, Mich. (1896).
AARRIAGE DURING LIFE OF FIRST WIFE AND HER SUBSEQUENT

DEATH.-Barker v. Valentine, 84 N. W. 297 (Mich.) 1900. This
case does not involve a new point, but one on which there is some conflict of authority. A man marries a woman in New York in 1872.
In 1884, while his wife is still living, hegoes to Detroit and cohabits
there with an unmarried woman, introducing her as his wife and
claiming to be married to her; in the neighborhood they are reputed
to he husband and wife. In 1889 the real wife in New York dies The
man still continues to live with the Detroit woman as her hus and,
and holds himself out to the world as such. Subsequently he dies
and she seeks to recover on an insurance policy in which she is
named as his wife, and, as such, beneficiary. The question whether
or not they are legally married being in issue, the court holds that
there is a presumption, from reputation and cohabitation subsequent
to the removal of the only impediment to their lawful marriage;
that they were in fact married.
The authorities which support the ruling of the court are numerous, the leading ones being Campbell v.Campbell, L. R., 1 H. L. Sc.
182; (1867) De Thoren v. The Attorney- General, L. R., 1 App.
Cti. 686; (1876) Blanchard v. Lambert, 43 Iowa, 228; (1876)
Yates v. Houston, 3 Tex. 433 (1848). See also Bishop on Marriage
and Divorce, § 970, 975.
On the other hand, there are authorities which hold that, when a
particular status exists, the law will presume its continuance, and
when it is asserted that it has been changed, some evidence of that
fact must be produced. Therefore, it' the relationship between a
man and woman is meretricious and illicit in its origin, the presumption will be (in the absence of any proof of a change of mind) that it

continues such after the removal of any impediment which prevented
a lawful marriage. This view is supported by Lapsley v. Grierson,
1 H. L. Cas. 498; (1848) Cargile v. Mood, 63 Mo. 501; (1876)
Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251; (1875) Cram v. Burnham, 5 Mle.
213 (1828).
The case of Lapsley v. Grierson, just cited, hints at what is per-
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haps the true criterion in distinguishing these apparently irreconcilable views. Marriage is, after all, nothing more than an executed
contract, and for a marriage to be valid there must have been an
intention, freely exercised, on the part of both parties, to enter into
the marriage relation. A marriage may sometimes be presumed
from reputation and cohabitation, but these latter do not themselves
constitute the marriage; they are simply rebuttable evidence that the
parties intended to contract and did in fact contract a lawful
marriage. Since, therefore, the question is one of intention, is not
that intention to be found by inquiring whether the parties, when
they began their illicit connection, knew of the existing impediment,
or whether they innocently thought they were in lact assuming
marital obligations? If the parties originally intended to contract
marriage, would it not be reasonable to suppose that as soon as the
impediment to that marriage was removed, their continuing to
cohabit together was a cohabitation in the capacity of husband and
wife? And, on the other hand, if the first connection was knowingly illicit, would it not be logical to infer that the parties, having
shown their disregard of morality in the first instance, are not to be
presumed to have legalized their status when the opportunity presented itself? It is no answer to say, as was said in Yates v. Houston, supra, that, "Admitting that their original intercourse was
illicit with the knowledge of both parties, it would be urging
ihe presumption to an unreasonable extent to suppose that the
unlawful character of the connection was unsusceptible of change,
and that when all legal disabilities had ceas, d to operate, they would
voluntarily decline to assume all the honors, advantages and rights
of the matrimony." It is submitted that the question is not whether
the unlawful character of the connection is "unsusceptible" of
change, but whether it was changed in fact, and why, under such
circumstances, should there be a presumption that it was so changed ?
The same considerations do not apply, however, where the intention
of the parties originally was to contract marriage, and neither of
them knew of the then existing impediment.
The Pennsylvania law on the subject is contained in Hunt's Appeal,86 Pa. 294 (1878). That case holds that a relation between a man
and woman which was illicit at the commencement is presumed to
continue so until proof of change, and a marriage therefore will
not be presumed from cohabitation and reputation, where the relation between the parties was of an illicit origin, in the absence of
proof of a subsequent actual marriage. It is to be noted, however,
that, under the facts of that case, the man knew that his wile was
still living when he began cohabiting with the other woman.
H.s.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-PAROL CONTRACT-PART PERFORIM-

ANCE.-Jorgenson v. Jorgenson et al., 84 N. W. 221 (Supreme Court
of Minnesota, November 26, 1900). The action was by George 0.
Jorgenson against Tilda Jorgenson and others. The judgment was
for plaintiff. This is an appeal from an order denying a new trial.
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"In 1885 K. 0. Jorgenson, now deceased, was the owner in fee of
the land in question, and at that time entered into a verbal contract
or agreement with plaintiff, who was his brother, to sell and convey
the same to plaintiff for the consideration of $500, to be paid in
annual installments thereafter. Under and in pursuance of the contract, and in reliance thereon, plaintiff entered into possession of the
land and has, at all times, since retained it; that is, he has held and
retained such possession as was incident and necessary to the cultivation of the land. At the time the contract was entered into the
land was uncultivated and unimproved prairie land, and plaintiff has
since then broken up, cultivated and improved it, raising thereon
annual crops of grain. Plaintiff has paid all taxes levied and
assessed againt the land since the contract was made. K. 0. Jorgenson died in 1899, without having conveyed the land to plaintiff,
though the full purchase money had been paid to him."
The defendant, Tilda Jorgenson, his widow, was not a party to the
contract, and, of course, no judgment was or could be ordered against
her, but against the surviving children of the deceased.
The purchase price was paid at different times, the greater part
having been paid more than six years before the entry of this action.
The defendants offered the following points against a decree for specific performance: "(1) '1hat the evidence fails to show that a
contract of sale was, in fact, ever made; (2) that it fails to show a
payment of the purchase price, conced.ng the contract to have been
made, and (3) that there has been no sufficient part performance to
take the case without the statute of frauds." It may also be well to
mention that there were neither buildings nor fences on the land.
Little attention need be paid to the first two points. They relate
wholly to matters of evidence. The court below found both that a
contract had existed and that the purchase price had been paid, and
the Supreme Court pronounced the evidence in the record "wholly
satisfactory." Possession of the land for fifteen years would surely raise
a presumption of some kind of a contract between the plaintiff and
the deceased, on the part of the plaintiff-either that of lessee or
purchaser.
In Minnesota there is a statute prohibiting any party to an action
from giving evidence of or concerning any conversation with or
admission of a deceased person, relative to any matter at issue
between the parties. It has been decided there that this prohibition
does not relate to evidence of the acts of a deceased person, although
such acts may have in law the effect of admissions. The exclusion
relates only to conversations or oral admissions. Now, having passed
this difficulty, the case may be tried and decided just as if the alleged
vendor, K. 0. Jor,_enson, were living.
The Supreme Court proceeds with an inquiry as to whether the
evidence shows a part performance, sufficient to avoid the statute of
frauds, and says: "The rule that part performance of a verbal
contract for the sale of land takes it out of the operation of the
statute of frauds is founded on the equitable doctrine of estoppel,
and is applied in all cases where the part performance shown is of
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such a nature and character that to permit the vendor to take advantage of the statute would work a fraud upon or substantial injury to
the purchaser." Then, after the citation of a number of Minnesota
cases bearing on the point, the court continues thus: "In the light
of this principle, we have only to inquire whether the refusal of the
relief prayed for in this case would regult in injustice or substantial
injury and loss, to the plaintiff. That it would there could be no
serious doubt. No doubt the use of the land during these years
more than compensated plaintiff for all improvements made thereon.
But if the contract be not enforced he will be damaged and substantially preiudiced to the extent of the purchase price, paid by him
more than six years ago, and also to the extent of the taxes, paid by
him prior to that time. He cannot recover such payments at this
time by reason of the statute of limitations, and unless the contract
be performed such payments will be a total loss to him, and an
unjust gain to the vendor, or at least to his estate. His loss will be
a very substantial one, and the heirs should not be heard to urge in
defence that the contract was within the statute of frauds and unenforceable." The order decreeing specific performance was affirmed.
Under the laws of Minnesota and all the facts of the case the
decision was undoubtedly correct, and in accordance with the weight
of authority. However, it may be suggested that the reason given
for the decision is not above criticism. Practically speaking, the
important thing is the decision, and yet the reasons assigned, if incorrect, may in the future lead not only to incorrect reasons, but also
to incorrect decisions. The court, doubtless, did not mean to decide
that specific performance would be granted because the statute of
limitations would bar the recovery of the money paid by the vendee
to the vendor, or simply because the refusal would result "in injustice or substantial injury to the plaintiff." The weight of authority
seems to be against this bald proposition. As an example and
authority in jurisdictions in which the English statute of frauds is
in force, take the notd case of .Aaddisom v. Alderson, L. R., 8 App.
Cases, 467, decided in the House of Lords in 1883. Here a woman
had lived with Thomas Alderson from 1845 until his death in 1877.
Some years prior to 1860 she became his housekeeper, and continued
to act as such up to the time of his death. After his decease she
brought a bill for specific performance of a conrract to convey certain land to her for life, which she declared had been entered into
between them in 1860, when she was thinking of leaving him to
become married. The alleged conveyance was to be her pay for
staying. After his death a will was found, written in 1872 and executed in 1874, but it was void because it was not properly attested. In
this will the testator devis-d to the complainant the land which she
claimed by virtue of the oral agreement. The judges said it was a
case of great hardship, since the statute of limitations barred any
recovery fbr the faithful services she had rendered" the decedent.
Notwithstanding this irreparable injury to the complainant, specific
performance was refused.
Now, the statute of frauds in force in Minnesota is practically
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the English statute; but there are two reservations or exceptions in
their statutes. They are sections 4214 and 4216, Wenzell's General
Statutes of Minn. (1894). The first is: "The preceding section
(statute of frauds) shall not be construed to prevent any trust from
arising or being extinguished by implication or operation of law."
The second is: "Nothing, in this chapter contained, shall be-ton,strued to abridge the power of courts of equity to compel the specific
performance of agreements, in cases of part performance of such
agreements."
Having passed the difficulty in regard to the evidence, and found
that there had been fifteen years of possession under the vendor, now
deceased, and that the plaintiff had paid the money, there was a
resulting trust on the part of the vendor who still held the legal title
in trust for the vendee, his agreement having been entirely performed.
At this point no real difficulty could arise in enforcing specific performance. Mere lapse of time would not bar the vendee, bhcause
the statute never runs in favor of a trustee as against his cestui qua
trust, while the latter is in possession of his estate: Love v. Watkins,
40 Cal. 547 (1871); Gilbert v. Sleeper, 71 Cal. 290 (1886).
It seems that the same decision might have been arrived at, by
an application of the laws of Minnesota, on the theories indicated,
without a resort to the reasons assigned, which are not good in the
majority of jurisdictions.
3.B. W.

